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Above all, these numbers represent the result of multiple humanitarian crises that European countries cannot ignore without betraying their own values and principles. But the refugee and migration crisis also has consequences for internal European politics. Across the continent, asylum and immigration policy has moved to the centre of the political debate - from last year’s Brexit referendum in the UK, to this year’s national elections in France and Germany. Right-wing, nationalist and isolationist politicians and parties are feeding off and stoking anti-immigrant sentiments. They argue that immigration further burdens fragile European economies and see their worst fears vindicated in incidents such as the terrorist attack in Berlin in December 2016, conducted by a Tunisian failed asylum seeker.

This is where the refugee and migration crisis intersects with the security interests that drive European engagement with North Africa. For Europe, the challenge of countering terrorism (CT) and violent extremism (CVE) has a domestic and an external dimension - and working with the states of North Africa is essential in both. In addition to the Tunisian Berlin attacker, Anis Amri, many of the perpetrators of the 2015 and 2016 attacks in Paris and Brussels were second or third generation immigrants from Morocco and Algeria. It is of course important not to overstate the threat from asylum seekers, or demonise communities with North African roots. But reports that Moroccan intelligence services repeatedly warned German authorities about Amri’s ties to Daesh before his attack, underscore the importance of cross-Mediterranean intelligence sharing.

Europe also has a clear security interest in the domestic stability of its North African neighbours. Libya’s post-2011 collapse into chaos and civil war serves as the most glaring example in this context. As discussed above, the vast majority of refugees and migrants reaching Europe via the central-Mediterranean route have come through Libya where the state is incapable of controlling the borders and human traffickers are operating with impunity. Furthermore, Daesh and other extremist groups have been able to exploit Libya’s instability, at one point even establishing a substantial territorial presence in Sirte, and using it as a base to conduct attacks across the region, including the 2015 attack in Tunisia’s Sousse, in which 30 British tourists were killed. The terror campaign by Algerian extremists in France during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s serves as another cautionary tale.

While the refugee and migration crisis and CT/CVE interests are the most urgent imperatives for European engagement with North Africa, three other issues further demonstrate the truly strategic nature of this relationship.

Firstly, Europe has substantial economic interests in engaging with North Africa. Tackling the migration crisis is important to reduce the pressure on the economies of, in particular, southern European states. However, most importantly, closer economic cooperation across the Mediterranean offers great opportunities to both Europe and the North African states. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are all keen to expand their trade relationships with Europe; and for Europe, North Africa can be the gate to growing economies further south in Africa. Morocco, in

particular, has positioned itself as a potential bridge between the two continents. Finally, Libya and Algeria have extensive hydrocarbon resources that could help reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. Morocco is working with Nigeria to build a gas pipeline north along the Atlantic coast that could also reach Europe, and the kingdom is also one of the world’s pioneers in generating solar energy, which could one day be sold to European consumers.

Secondly, engaging with North Africa in a concerted and principled manner is important in order to uphold and maintain the credibility of European values. This includes the treatment of the refugees and migrants making the desperate journey across the Mediterranean and often suffering unimaginable hardship in camps on both sides of the sea. But it also extends to supporting the nascent, but struggling, Tunisian democracy, encouraging promising political reforms in Morocco, and defending adherence to human rights, especially at a time when the USA, led by President Trump, seems to be less interested in such matters.

Finally, having strong political, economic and security relationships with the states of North Africa is important for Europe’s geopolitical standing vis-a-vis ambitious powers such as Russia and China. The former recently upgraded its presence in the region, extending security ties with Egypt and Algeria, taking a growing interest in Libya’s crisis, and signing a ‘deep strategic partnership’ agreement with Morocco. Meanwhile, China appears to have anticipated Morocco’s role as a potential leading African economy and is investing in a $10 billion industrial hub near Tangiers. Although Russia and China’s presence in North Africa is not necessarily detrimental to European interests, it at least underscores that others are recognising opportunities in the region.

A Period of Change and Uncertainty

While the strategic imperative for European-North African cooperation and integration is clear, the development and implementation of actual policies is complicated by the fact that both regions are currently in the midst of a period of transformation and deep uncertainty.

As European policy-makers are looking across the Mediterranean, they see five countries on five very different political, economic and security trajectories. Egypt’s economy is in crisis while the government of President Abdelfattah Al-Sisi is taking an uncompromising strongman-approach to

dealing with the country’s post-2011 political turmoil. Libya has collapsed into near statelessness with three different governments vying for power, and countless militias and a number of extremist groups operating freely. Tunisia remains the one bright spot amongst the countries that experienced regime change in 2011, but its young democracy is struggling with a weak economy and a security crisis that has seen several thousand Tunisians join Daesh. Algeria appears outwardly stable, but its economy is struggling with low oil prices and the deteriorating health of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika creates significant political uncertainty. Finally, Morocco is a reforming monarchy with a promising economy, but faces the challenge of translating high-level reforms into tangible benefits for its poorest citizens.

Ultimately, change in North Africa has long been the expressed objective in European policy towards the region. Beginning with the Barcelona Process (also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) in 1995, and continuing with the 2004 formulation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, the members of the EU have sought to coordinate and formalise their approach towards Europe’s southern neighbourhood. Throughout, the promotion of liberalising and democratising economic and political reforms were placed front and centre. In essence, although somewhat simplified, it is possible to say that the ultimate goal of these policies was to reshape Europe’s neighbours in its own image. Yet, the dynamics of change currently at work in North Africa can hardly be considered to be in line with this intention.

At the same time, Europe is going through a significant period of uncertainty itself. The Euro currency crisis is far from over and many European economies, including those of heavyweights such as Italy and France, are struggling with slow growth and extensive youth unemployment. With Brexit, the EU is losing one its three most powerful members, which is also one of Europe’s most competent and active foreign political actors. Anti-EU sentiments are growing in other countries too, mixing with populist and anti-globalist forces. Even after the presidential elections in France, the future political direction of the country remains highly uncertain. Finally, Germany is caught between trying to hold the EU together, while becoming increasingly occupied with its own national elections, which will take place in September this year. Meanwhile, the spectre of Russian attempts to influence and undermine political debates everywhere is looming large. In sum, this means that in early 2017, Europe is a primarily inward-looking continent.

This sense of European uncertainty is reinforced by the lack of clarity in the transatlantic relationship, which has long been the central pillar of European foreign and security policy. The 

new administration’s signals on its commitment to Europe have been mercurial at best; and in the Middle East, President Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders and dismissive attitude towards human rights seem to be indicating a substantial shift away from the generally aligned European-American approach to the region.

Beware the Temptation of Short-Term Fixes

Confronted with the instability and unpredictability of change in North Africa, and preoccupied with internal political, economic and security challenges, European countries, both individually and collectively, are in danger of resorting to short-term, tactical policy measures towards their southern neighbours. This is particularly the case with regards to the refugee and migration crisis in the Mediterranean. The political climate in Europe, particularly in countries with upcoming elections and where populist politicians and parties are on the rise, puts pressure on governments to adopt strong positions and deliver immediate tangible results on their controlling borders. However, the resulting short-term measures risk being ineffective, at best, or counter-productive and leading to further instability on both sides of the Mediterranean, at worst.

Working closely with the United Nations, Europe is amongst the primary backers of Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), which is led by Fayez Al-Sarraj and was established through the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in December 2015. The idea was - and remains - to bring Libya’s many political and armed factions together under one government, which could then be a partner for the international community in preventing Libyan territory from being used as the primary staging ground for cross-Mediterranean migration. Whilst a negotiated settlement and the establishment of a unity government is almost certainly the only feasible way to end Libya’s ongoing conflict and stabilise the country, the GNA has thus far struggled to establish itself in the country. It remains opposed by other self-declared governments, is dependent on the support of several militias it does not truly control, and cannot shake its image as a foreign-installed entity.

The EU’s insistence to nevertheless seek agreements on controlling migration with the GNA and, amongst other measures, training a Libyan coast guard (driven especially by Italy), does yield the needed headlines for domestic European audiences, but may not contribute to the stabilisation of Libya. On the contrary: Al-Sarraj’s presence at a European migration summit in late March, while his capital Tripoli was shaken by protests and militia fighting, only vindicated his opponents who accuse him of serving the interests of foreign governments over those of the Libyan people.