APSACO Talks: « Covid-19 and security in Africa » Panel 2 Key points : The privatization of violence in Africa: non-state armed groups and private security
In the context of the Covid-19 crisis that has prevailed in Africa since March, the Policy Center for the New South organizes a special edition of one of its flagship annual events, the Annual Conference on Peace and Security in Africa, named for the occasion APSACO Talks.
This on-line version of the conference, spread over three days, has continued today with a panel on the « Privatization of Violence in Africa: Non-State Armed Groups and Private Security », moderated by Alioune Ndiaye (Senegal), Head of the Peace Division of the Islamic Education, Science and Culture Organization (ICESCO), where the belief is that “without peace there is no development”.
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Lack of delivery from the States, a platform for violence
Afua Boatemaa Yakohene (Ghana), Research Fellow at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), has reviewed a large variety of actors resorting to private violence, meaning “outside of the State”: terrorists, people fighting for freedom, political vigilantes acting in peaceful countries like Ghana, organized crime as well as law enforcement agencies supporting the use of private violence.
From the start, these groups have used the lack of infrastructures and compliance from the State on service delivery. The groups use violence as means of addressing problems of insecurity and marginalization – in terms of access to education, sheer poverty, lack of support for the private sector, lack of perspective for the youth and high unemployment. Some groups target resources rich areas, like Islamic groups fighting the Mozambican State in Cabo Delgado.
The resort to private violence is widespread, with opposition parties hiring “party boys” to fight for them, because they do not trust the regular forces of security, and should not surprise anyone in the current social context. The latter has created a platform for recruitment of young people and sympathy of the people for terrorists’ groups.
“Vigilante groups in the Sahel following ethnic lines”
Rida Lyammouri, Senior Fellow of Policy Center for the New South, reminded that the Sahel region experienced its deadliest year in 2019, and is facing a serious situation again in 2020. The reason of increased violence lies in a multidimensional conflict, involving multiple actors.
The first main actors destabilizing the Sahel are the jihadist groups, affiliated to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and present in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, with concentration along the borders of Liptako Gourma. The jihadist violence that has started in North Mali in 2012 has expanded elsewhere – to Ivory Coast, Northern Benin and North Western Nigeria. Other actors are involved in the level of casualties, such as the national and regional armies, the Sahel G5 – accused of being involved in extrajudicial killings -, the French operation Barkhane, but also the vigilante groups operating in Mali and Burkina Faso, where civilians are armed by the State to provide security in the north of the country. This is dangerous, as there are ethnic-based vigilantes with specific agendas going beyond the protection of their communities – sometimes intentions of revenge or access to economic interests. The solution is to create an environment where violence and terrorism could not exist, with supporting the local institutions with capacities to monitor and analyze information. National and international partners could focus on sidelining individuals or criminal networks destabilizing the region.
Weak states with high level of corruption
Duncan E. Omondi Gumba (Ethiopia), Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), underlined the existence of corrupt people in governments, ready to collaborate with illicit activities from internal or external mafia groups. He mentioned the negative influence of organized crime in South Africa, Somalia, Nigeria and Mali.
Apart from collaboration with State embedded bodies, there is also competition: the Al Shabaabs consider themselves more effective than the State in providing security, for instance. Groups are organizing economic exploitation, a well-known phenomenon in North-Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, while in Nigeria, there is a criminal entrepreneurship at the level of every State of the Federation. High levels of official corruption and clientelism in these countries are common factors, found in Mali and Somalia. Major actors of private violence have become political entrepreneurs in Chad, Mozambique, Uganda, South Africa and Kenya. These groups exacerbate the State dysfunction and failure.
A new narrative on Covid-19 by terrorist groups
El Mostafa Rezrazi, Senior Fellow of the Policy Center of the New South, has reflected on two hypotheses: first, the one stating that Covid-19 has no impact on the ongoing violence, with 170 attacks per month; and second, stating that terrorist groups have on the contrary taken advantage of the health situation to reconstruct their strategies and positioning.
There has been warning messages in violent extremist media, that should be better monitored and closely followed, knowing that the groups are watching the academic analysis we are producing on them. These are indicating if groups are still dangerous or not, and can lead to arrests.