Mediterranean Strategy Group - The Changing Nature of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Mediterranean
Naples, Italy
By Invitation
Organized by The German Marshall Fund of the United States in partnership with OCP Policy Center, the Compagnia di San Paolo and Noble Energy Inc.
The Mediterranean Strategy Group (MSG) is a high-level, bi-annual meeting that includes roughly 40 representatives from the public and private sectors from both sides of the Atlantic and all sides of the Mediterranean. Its main objective is to identify both emerging issues important to the Mediterranean region and transatlantic policy implications. The series is organized in partnership with the Compagnia di San Paolo, the OCP Policy Center, and Noble Energy.
The two-day convening will be composed of the following five sessions:
Session I – Understanding the New Terrorism
The Mediterranean has a long modern experience with terrorism, and the region – north and south – has been strongly affected by shifts in terrorist motives, objectives and tactics. The Levant and North Africa are focal points in the struggle against the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. This struggle is complicated by large-scale migration, human trafficking and criminality in the Mediterranean, and the declining capacity of states in the face of stark social, economic and political challenges. What are the contours of this “newest” terrorism? What are the key drivers? What are the implications for the future of Mediterranean security as a whole? How is Mediterranean terrorism affecting security on both sides of the Atlantic, and on a global basis?
Session II – Beyond Jihad: The Mediterranean’s Other Terrorists
Beyond terrorism inspired by Islamic extremism, Southern Europe, the Levant and the Maghreb continue to face a variety of more traditional terrorist movements, from national liberation and separatist networks, to terrorists inspired by radical right and left wing ideologies. Why are these forms of terrorism so durable? What are the areas of special risk? What new types of terrorism could emerge in a period of great social and political flux in Europe and elsewhere? What lessons can be learned from past and contemporary experience?
Session III – The Maritime Security Dimension
With continuing conflict in Syria, the growing IS presence in Libya and the Sinai, and with naval forces and coast guards operating more actively around the Mediterranean, the potential for terrorism at sea, or against naval and commercial shipping in port may be increasing. What has been the experience of maritime terrorism and counter-terrorism in the Mediterranean? What are the key flashpoints (Suez? The Aegean? The risk of “drive-by” attacks in the central Mediterranean? The energy, cruise and tourism industries?). Why has there not been more terrorism of this kind? Is the risk growing? How will this affect commercial operations and military force protection?
Session IV – The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon and How to Address It
Mediterranean states have considerable experience with the foreign fighter phenomenon, notably in the circulation of fighters from the Maghreb to Afghanistan in the 1980s, and in the more recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, in addition to Europe, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt are leading contributors to the contingent of foreign fighters operating in Syria, Iraq and Libya. Turkey is a major conduit, source, and target for foreign recruits to IS. Virtually all Mediterranean societies, north and south, are affected by this phenomenon, and the circulation of foreign fighters could shape the internal security of Mediterranean states for many years to come. What are the contours of the problem? What can be done to contain or defeat it?
Rethinking Counter-Terrorism Strategies and Partnerships
Terrorism is a major factor in the internal security of Mediterranean states, but the trans-regional character of the threat is also shaping security strategies from Washington to Brussels, from Moscow to Beijing. Counter-terrorism in relation to threats emanating from Europe’s southern periphery is central to the EU’s global strategy review, and should be an important item on NATO’s agenda looking toward the July 2016 Warsaw summit. In light of the evolving threat, what new responses are required? What new initiatives are needed, and what current practices should be changed? Are new state and non-state partnerships needed? What can be done to harden targets, and to harden societies against threats that may not be avoidable?
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